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Abstract 
This research has a twofold target. For one extent it embraces on a wider historical period previous analyzed 
related to the innovative bodies of law introduced by the Vietti’s Reform in 2004, providing an overall 
evidence related to the Italian corporate system, ranging from consistency and dynamics of the different 
forms of legal entities, to their corporate governance and ownership structures. For another extent it proposes 
completely new data about other patterns of “Corporate Italy” which have never been enquired in a 
systematic way before. The paper provides a wide analysis of the ownership structures of unlisted joint stock 
Italian companies and of the limited liability companies describing the number of all the M&A deals or 
corporations’ transformation or liquidation during 2012. 
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1. Introduction and related literature 
 
The 2004 Vietti’s Reform [1] introduced remarkable innovations in the body of the Italian Corporate Law, 
like alternative one tier and two tier systems of corporate governance for unlisted joint stock companies or 
the provision of specific bonds which may be issued by limited liability joint stock companies   (article   
2483   of   the   Civil   Code). 
Moreover the Reform allowed for joint stock companies further substantial innovations like the allowance 
for unlisted companies to entrust accounting auditing to an external auditor in non mandatory way (article 
2409 bis of the Civil Code) or the duty to declare any sort of legal entities which are eventually in charge of 
a role of supervision and coordination of the corporate and business activities, according to the articles 2497 
and following of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding this last institute was conceived for other purposes, it 
triggered the positive externality to allow scholars and practitioners to delve into the patterns and sizes of the 
Italian group of enterprises’ phenomenon. 
The introduction of these innovations represented the opportunity for a wider project of research 
encompassing both the analysis of stocks and dynamics of all the legal entities managing business activities 
and the monitoring of the widespread of the new institutes generated by the Vietti’s Reform. This stream of 
studies which has been promoted by the Monitoring Committee [2] of the Chamber of Commerce of Milan 
with the data provided by the network of the Italian Chambers of Commerce, denominated Infocamere, 
represents a completely innovative field of research between law, economics and business studies. It has 
been supplied for the first time, at least in the Italian environment, a complete and fully detailed dataset and 
successively an historical series ranging since 2004 to 2012 of the main features of the Corporate Italy, 
regarding any sort of legal entities managing business activities, including the different typologies of no 
profit organizations (Bellavite Pellegrini 2006, 2009, 2012). 
The aim of this study is at least twofold. For one extent it is intended to update the existing above mentioned 
historical series in order to monitor and explain the dynamics of the stocks of the Italian legal entities. The 
same target is pursued in relation to the different levels of implementation of the various institutes promoted 
by the Vietti’s Reform [3]. However this study supplies additional evidences which were not available in the 
previously mentioned researches, providing the complete survey of the ownership’s structures of the unlisted 
joint stock and limited liability Italian  
companies. Moreover for the same typology of legal entities the paper gives evidence of all the different 
typologies of corporate deals that occurred during 2012 in Italy. Law and Economics studies are likely to 
receive clear benefits from an accurate and meticulous knowledge of the stocks of legal entities managing 
business activities and their relative weight and a systematic information about the main distinguishing 
features of the mainly unlisted “Corporate Italy.” 
This research is organized in the following way. The second section describes the Italian companies stocks’ 
time series since 2005, meanwhile the third section is dedicated to the time series of the eventual 
implementation by companies of the institutes introduced by the Reform. A specific focus will be devoted to 
the feasible reasons of success or failure of these institutes. The fourth and the fifth sections will deal the 
new data about the ownership’s structures of the unlisted Italian joint stock and limited liability companies 
and about the different typologies of corporate deals which took place in 2012. The last paragraph will 
provide some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Time series of Italian legal entities since 2005 [4] 
 
We will take into analysis stocks and dynamics of joint stock companies and partnerships, focusing our 
attention separately on the two different categories. Successively we will dedicate our attention to the legal 
entities belonging to the cooperative world. All these evidences have as starting point on June 30th 2005. 
Table 1 provides data about the still existing [5] joint stock companies, partnerships and cooperatives. 
 Table 1. Typologies of still existing limited and unlimited liability companies in Italy [6] 
 
LEGAL ENTITIES TYPOLOGIES 30.06.05 31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13  
Joint stock companies 61,314 60,631 59,127 57,107 55,956 48,033  
Limited liability joint stock 
companies 
1,046,139 1,129,003 1,162,586 1,261,295 1,305,705 1,357,936  
Limited partnership   joint   stock 
companies 
175 184 182 178 174 150  
Total of joint stock companies 1,107,628 1,189,818 1,221,895 1,318,580 1,361,835 1,406,119  
Non commercial partnership 68,143 69,130 69,089 70,500 71,561 72,743  
Agricoltural non commercial 
partnership 
     
46,052  
General partnership companies 646,597 637,024 611,436 588,969 575,642 540,862  
Limited partnership companies 512,398 527,679 515,771 519,820 515,502 504,596  
Total partnership companies 1,227,138 1,233,833 1,196,296 1,179,289 1,162,705 1,118,201  
Total cooperatives 139,306 140,426 148,033 152,007 153,678 144,251  
Total - general 2,474,072 2,564,077 2,566,224 2,649,876 2,678,218 2,668,571  
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
Table 1 highlights two very clear different trends existing since 2005. A significant increase of 26.94% of the 
number of the different typologies of limited liability companies and a decline of 8.87% of partnerships. The 
trend of the cooperatives shows a small increase of 3.54%, but the dynamic within the period is more 
complex. Partnerships are likely to confirm the negative trend starting in 2006, after a relative increase in the 
precedent 2002-2006 period of time (Bellavite Pellegrini 2006). 
If we look more specifically at the different typologies of companies, joint stock companies register a sharp 
decline of 21.66% in their numbers in seven years time, meanwhile the number of limited liability joint stock 
companies significantly increases of 29.75%, even more highlighting a long term steady rate of growth 
(Bellavite Pellegrini 2009). It is detectable the existence of a substitution effect between the two categories 
of companies for two possible feasible reasons. Limited liability joint stock companies are more convenient 
in terms of transaction costs because of some facilities introduced by the Reform. Moreover the insurgence 
of the economic and financial crisis since 2007 is likely to have fostered the incorporations of these 
companies. The decrease in partnerships is strictly linked with fall of 16.35% of the number of general 
partnership companies. Moreover non commercial partnership, 63.30% of them belong to the agricultural 
sector, realized a 6.75% growth in the period. 
The Vietti’s Reform introduced the opportunity of incorporating single shareholder companies. This 
innovative institute registered a significant success in these few years representing a new form of corporate 
business, as it is highlighted in Table 2. 
  
Table 2. Single shareholder joint stock and limited liability joint stock companies 
Single shareholder companies 30.06.05 31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Single shareholder joint stock 
companies 
5,207 6,062 6,414 7,011 7,182 7,198 
Percentage of the total 8.49% 9.99% 10.84% 12.27% 12.83% 14.98% 
Single shareholder limited liability 













Percentage of the total 6.43% 8.09% 9.19% 11.41% 12.54% 14.69% 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
Table 2 shows respectively an increase of 38.23% and 1.96 times of stock of single shareholder joint stock 
and limited liability joint stock companies and a ratio on the total of the still existing companies of their 
specific category uprising respectively since 8.49% and 6.43% to the very similar percentage of 14.98% and 
14.69%. 
The opportunity of incorporating single shareholder companies has been quite popular in the Italian group of 
enterprises (Bellavite Pellegrini 2006, 2009) and has crowded completely out the competing institute of the 
designed estate to a specific bargain, which experienced a substantial failure of its implementation. Table 3 
devotes its attention to the legal entities managing business activities belonging to the non-profit sector. This 
time series starts since June 30th 2006. 
 
Table 3. Still existing legal entities belonging to the non-profit sector [7] 
Typology of legal entities 30.06.06 31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Still existing associations 12,194 12,648 13,881 15,884 16,850 19,150 
Still existing foundations 1,539 1,583 1,671 1,971 2,089 2,375 
Total 13,733 14,231 15,552 17,855 18,939 21,525 
Still existing unions 21,272 21,097 21,712 22,231 22,479 22,182 
Still existing economic 
group of European interest 
147 144 154 174 198 218 
Still existing nonprofit 
legal entities 
35,152 35,472 37,418 40,260 41,616 43,925 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
  
Table 3 gives evidence of a high rate of growth of associations and foundations in this period with a total 
increase of 56.93% which may be divided in similar rate, i.e. 57.04% for associations and 54.32% for 
foundations. Financial and economic crisis’ s breaking up is likely to have impressed a further relevant 
stimulus to the rate of incorporations of non-profit legal entities, probably underlining in this way the 
anticyclical nature of this sector [8]. Unions, not withstand they are mainly a category of legal entities more 
developed in the past times, register an increase of 4.27%. typologies.  
3.Time series of the degree of implementation of the institutes introduced by the Vietti’s Reform 
This paragraph is devoted to measure the degree of implementation of the different institutes introduced by 
the Vietti’s Reform and to monitor whether do exist meaningful differences in comparison with the 
previously emerged trends. We take into analysis the existence of statutory provisions to issue special debt 
instruments (ex article 2483 of the Civil Code) by limited liability joint stock companies. We cannot verify 
whether these financial devices have been effectively issued, because our database does not report these data. 
For some extent we may however consider that a statutory provision may be a (weak) proxy of the feasible 
willingness of the companies to eventually issue them. 
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Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
  
Table 4 shows the historical series about the implementation of the statutory provisions for issuing special 
debt devices. This table confirms the evidence that approximately 19% of the limited liability joint stock 
companies contemplate in their incorporation acts this provision. Moreover this innovation gained a clear 
success among the single shareholder companies, with an adoption rate of 25.12%, showing their more 
innovative nature in comparison with traditional companies. Whether for some extent statutory provisions 
could be a feasible proxy of adoption, the effective issue of these specific bonds is unknown, but anecdotal 
impression is supporting the idea of a very low rate of implementation. 
Alternative corporate governance systems are one of the most interesting innovative institutes introduced by 
Vietti’s Reform. Table 5 is related to the numbers of joint stock companies adopting one- tier alternative 
corporate governance systems since their introduction. 
  
Table 5. Joint stock companies adopting one-tier alternative corporate governance systems 
Typologies 31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.08 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Still existing single 














Still existing joint stock 
companies 
172 167 155 144 141 136 
Total 196 198 187 180 181 180 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
Since 2007 the stock of companies adopting a one-tier board experienced a 9.1% decrease, meanwhile the 
number has not registered any variation since 2009. Notwithstanding an initial interest and involvement by 
corporate managers and shareholders about this alternative form of corporate governance, we must register 
that the rate of effective adoption is extremely low, representing the 0.37% and therefore a marginal 
percentage of the still existing joint stock companies. 
Table 6 gives evidence of the stock of joint stock companies adopting a two-tier board alternative corporate 
governance system. 
  
Table 6. Joint stock companies adopting two-tier alternative corporate governance systems 
Typologies 31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.08 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Still existing single 














Still existing joint 
stock companies 
91 107 114 101 98 86 
Total 119 143 150 138 136 119 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
The number of joint stock companies adopting a two-tier board of corporate governance increased between 
2006 and 2008 and dropped in 2013 to the same level of 2006, representing only the 0.24% of the still 
existing joint stock companies. Table 7 presents evidences about all the joint stock companies adopting a one 
tier or two tier alternative corporate governance systems. 
  




31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.08 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
One-tier board / 196 198 187 180 181 180 
Two-tier board / 119 143 150 138 136 119 
Total 284 315 341 337 318 317 299 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
If we make an overview about alternative corporate governance systems, it could be assert that these systems 
are experiencing a decrease in the number of their aggregate adoption. However because of the sharper 
decrease of the total numbers of joint stock companies, those adopting an alternative corporate governance 
systems upraised of some basis point, since 0.55% in 2009 to 0.62% in 2013. As above argued the initial 
interest of scholars and practitioners for these innovative corporate governance systems (Bellavite Pellegrini, 
Pellegrini, Sironi 2010a; Bellavite Pellegrini, Pellegrini, Sironi 2010 b) did not transform in a significant 
degree of adoption by companies of these systems. 
Coming to another point the Reform introduced the chance for unlisted  joint stock companies to entrust 
accounting auditing to an external auditor and not to the board of auditors, without any mandatory rule. 
Corporate finance literature explains that unlisted joint stock companies are likely to entrust accounting 
auditing to an external auditor in order to more efficaciously contrast the phenomenon of earning 
manipulation (Baetge and Thiele 1998, Franks and Mayer 1998), mainly for venture capital or private equity 
companies, because executive compensations’ policies necessarily rely on these accounting datasets. Table 
8 presents stocks and dynamics of joint stock companies entrusting in different ways accounting auditing to 
the board of auditors or to an external auditor. 
  
Table 8. Different ways of entrusting accounting auditing for joint stock companies 
Entrusted subject of 
accounting auditing [11] 
30.06.05 31.12.07 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Board of auditors 33,210 45,614 42,694 40,969 36,511 
 (54.16 %) (77.14%) (74.76%) (73.22%) (75.78%) 
External auditors 3,104 6,060 10,147 10,742 11,672 
 (5.05%) (10.24%) (17.77%) (19.20%) (24.22%) 
Still existing   joint   stock      
companies that declared to 36,314 51,674 52,841 51,711 48,183 
which subjects   accounting (59.22%) (87.39%) (92.53%) (92.41%) (100%) 
auditing has been entrusted      
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
The number of joint stock companies entrusting accounting auditing to any sort of external auditors 
represents roughly one quarter of the total still existing joint stock companies. Previous evidences (Bellavite 
Pellegrini, Pellegrini, and Sironi 2009) suggest that, notwithstanding the introduction of this new institute, 
joint stock companies entrusting in no mandatory way the accounting auditing to an external auditor do 
represent a partially residual phenomenon in the Italian corporate environment. 
We take now into examination the same evidence related to limited liability joint stock companies. In order 
to achieve this result, it is previously necessary to enumerate the number of limited liability joint stock 
companies which, by law [12], do foresee the presence of a mandatory board of auditor. These evidences are 
presented in Table 9. 
  
Table 9. Limited liability joint stock companies with Board of Auditors [13] 
Typologies 31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Limited liability joint 
stock companies with 
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Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
Limited liability joint stock companies with mandatory Board of Auditors are less than 3% of the total, 
registering a decrease in number and in percentage since 2006. The great majority of them entrust the 
accounting auditing to the same Board of Auditors, continuing the deeply rooted Italian tradition. In Table 10 
we present the different typologies of limited liability joint stock companies and their ways of entrusting 
accounting monitoring to different subjects. 
  
 
Table 10. Typologies of still existing limited liability joint stock companies with Board of Auditors and 
modalities of entrusting accounting auditing 
Limited liability joint 
stock companies 
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Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
The parsimonious number of limited liability joint stock companies with Board of Auditors substantially 
entrusts the accounting monitoring process to the same Board of Auditors, representing the external auditor a 
residual solution, probably for reasons connected with regulatory requirements [14]. Single shareholder 
limited liability joint stock companies represent a significant percentage of the ones endowed with the Board 
of Auditors and show a definitely higher percentage of 31.5% of entrusting an external auditor in comparison 
with traditional companies. It is likely that this higher percentage, albeit connected with the more dynamic 
nature of single shareholder companies, does not however depend on non-mandatory bases. 
Table 11 surveys the implementation of article 2497 of the Civil Code related to the different typologies of 
limited liability and joint stock companies declaring to be subject to the activity of control and coordination 
by another legal entity. These evidences contribute to sketch for the first time some outlines of the main 
economical and juridical features of the Italian phenomenon of the groups of enterprises. 
  
Table 11. Still existing companies declaring to be subject to control and coordination by another legal entity 
ex article 2497 of the Civil Code 
Typologies 20.07. 05 31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Still existing single 














Still existing joint stock 
companies 
4,812 5,246 5,213 4,973 4,804 4,339 
Total 7,658 8,830 9,015 8,967 8,828 8,341 
Still existing single 
shareholder limited 














Still existing limited 














Total 17,438 22,694 24,579 27,555 29,208 32,054 
Total of companies 















Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
In the above table the numbers of companies subject to control and coordination activity by other legal 
entities registered a significant increase of 60%. Approximately 17.3% of the joint stock companies are 
subject to control and coordination, meanwhile only 2.3% of the limited liability joint stock companies do 
belong to some group of enterprises. Moreover more than a half (52.62%) of the various typologies of 
companies subject to control and coordination is composed by single shareholder companies. This 
consideration suggests that one of the reason of the single shareholder companies relevant success is linked 
with the presence of these typologies of legal entities in the companies’ groups. These evidences must be 
composed with the further ones provided by Table 12 and Table 13. In Table 12 we supply a comprehensive 
overview of the number of legal entities managing an activity of supervision and coordination on behalf of 
the above described companies, meanwhile Table 13 supplies more detailed information about the natures of 
the controlling legal entities. 
  
Table 12. Legal entities managing activity of control and coordination 
Typologies 20.07. 
05 
31.12.06 31.12.07 31.12.09 31.12.10 01.03.13 
Foreign controlling 
legal entities 


















10,207 12,575 13,479 14,974 15,714 16,994 
Total of legal 
entities managing 














Total of the 
companies subject 














Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
The number of legal entities managing activity of control and coordination increased of 69.48% since 2005, 
whose one third are foreign controlling legal entities. The ratio between controlling legal entities and 
controlled companies remains stable in time at roughly 1.6. Table 13 suggests a further step in our 
description, analysing the different nature of the legal entities managing activity of control and coordination. 
Table 13. Typologies of legal entities managing activity of control and coordination (average values) 
Typologies 2009 Average values 
2010-2013 
Percentage on the total of 
controlling legal entities 
(2010-2013) 
Limited partnership with share capital 43 43 0.26% 
Single shareholder joint stock companies 848 919 5.62% 
Cooperative joint stock companies 18 22.5 0.14% 
Joint stock companies 4,798 4,792 29.30% 
Total of joint stock companies 5,707 5,776.5 35.32% 
Single shareholder limited liability joint stock 
companies 1,312 1,665 10.18% 
Cooperative 
companies 
limited liability joint stock 
20 30 0.18% 
Limited liability joint stock companies 6,786 7,627 46.64% 
Total of 
companies 
limited liability joint stock 
8,118 9,322 57% 
Limited partnerships 335 373.5 2.28% 
Individual concerns 20 20 0.12% 
Non commercial partnerships 28 30.5 0.19% 
General partnerships 221 237 1.45% 
Total of partnership 604 661 4.04% 
Cooperatives 385 424.5 2.60% 
Foundations 12 18 0.11% 
Associations 35 37.5 0.23% 
Unions 29 30.5 0.19% 
Public bodies 75 74 0.45% 
Religious and moral bodies 9 9 0.05% 
Other subjects 160 169 1.04% 
Classified controlling legal entities 14,974 16,353 100% 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
  
These data confirm previous evidences about the prevailing nature of joint stock and limited liability joint 
stock companies as legal entities controlling roughly 92% of the companies declaring to be subject to 
supervision and coordination, while joint stock companies represent approximately two third of these 
companies. Single shareholder joint stock and limited liability companies represent roughly 15% of the 
controlling legal entities. The residual portion of this universe (less than 10%) is composed by other 
typologies of legal entities ranging from individual concerns to non commercial partnerships, foundations, 
associations and even public or religious and moral bodies. These subjects constitute a interesting evidence 
because they reveal an intriguing, even if residual, side of the nature of particular legal entities at the top of 
the Italian Group of Enterprises. 
  
4. Ownership structures 
Corporations’ ownerships structures have been assuming an increasing relevance among the main issues of 
corporate finance and corporate governance. Financial literature has devoted an almost exclusive care to the 
ownerships’ structures of listed companies, because of their connection with the nature of agency costs. 
Much less attention has been dedicated to unlisted companies, mainly because of the shortage of significant 
samples of reliable data. However with regard to Italy the role of unlisted companies played and still plays a 
predominant role in the Italian corporate environment. In this section we provide these completely innovative 
data about ownership’s structures composition of Italian unlisted companies. In Table 14 we supply 






Table 14. Number of shareholders/partners of joint stock companies 
 Number of shareholders/partners (X) 
 1<X≤3 4≤X≤5 6≤X≤9 X≥10 Total 
Joint stock companies 16,469 6,934 5,027 5,605 34,035 [16] 
Percentage of the total 48.39% 20.37% 14.77% 16.47% 
83% of the total of still existing 
joint stock companies 
      
Limited liability joint 
stock companies 
858,454 147,766 45,521 15,315 1.067.056 
 









92.12% of the total of still existing 
limited liability joint stock 
companies 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
From these first data it stems out the confirmation of the existence of a concentrated ownership’s structure. 
Approximately a half of joint stock companies have no more than three shareholders and this percentage 
rises up to 80% for limited liability joint stock companies. For these latter if we add companies with no more 
than five stockholders, the percentage reaches 94.3%. For the former there are however a little more than 
30% of the companies having six or more than six shareholders. According to these evidences we may 
suppose that only these last companies which correspond to a number of a little less than 11,000 corporations 
may effectively present some ingredients of complexity in their corporate governance. 
In Table 15 we analyze the percentage of ownership of the first and of the first three shareholders in joint 
stock companies. These additional evidences do confirm the ones emerged in Table 14. For the 53.49% 
companies the first shareholder owns more than 51% of the shares and if we consider the first three 
shareholders this percentage rises to 91.47% of the analyzed companies. Conversely the percentage of 
companies in which the first shareholder owns less than 33% of the capital, represent 21.42% of the 
companies. If we juxtapose this outcome with the previous result about the number of shareholders, we have 
an implicit confirm about the likelihood of the existence of some effective corporate governance issues in 
approximately 10,000 joint stock companies. If we implement the same procedure to limited liability joint 
stock companies, we find a number of companies with more than six stockholders of approximately 60,000 
companies. 
  




Percentage of capital of shareholders 
 Percentage of capital of the first shareholder [17] 

































1.11% 5.68% 13.99% 24.66% 27.71% 25.07% 
Total 1.22% 5.93% 14.27% 25.09% 28.13% 25.36% 
       
 Percentage of capital of the first three shareholders [18] 

































0.37% 0.59% 1.54% 5.53% 25.40% 64.29% 
Total 0.40% 0.66% 1.67% 5.80% 26.02% 65.45% 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
  
In Table 16 we propose the ownership’s structure of limited liability joint stock companies, in which we 
notice that these latter present very similar features with the ones highlighted in joint stock companies. 
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Total 0.25% 2.44% 11.17% 35.28% 25.32% 25.55% 
       





























liability joint stock 
- - - - 0.01% 0.08% 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
In approximately 50% of the limited liability companies the first shareholder holds more than 51% of the 
companies, meanwhile this percentage rises up to 96.59% if we consider the first three shareholders. Only in 
13.86% of the companies the first shareholder holds a stake inferior to 33% of the capital, percentage which 
drops to less than 1% if we again take into consideration the first three shareholders. For these latter, which 
correspond at roughly 12,000 companies we may presume some more difficult elements of corporate 
governance. 
  
5. Evidences about corporate deals in Italy 
In this fifth section we propose new evidences about the number of different corporate deals [21] regarding 
joint stock and limited liability companies which occurred in Italy during 2012. Because of the innovative 
nature of these data we do not have any previous evidences to compare with. Table 17 highlights the 
evidences related to joint stock companies. 
  
Table 17. Joint stock companies deals in 2012 
Typologies NI D B L M C Total 
Joint stock companies        
Limited partnership with 
share capital 
4 8 4 - - 6 
 
Single shareholder joint 
stock companies 
175 496 224 303 1 391 
 
Cooperative joint stock 
companies 
20 17 13 18 - 13 
 
Joint stock companies 512 1,076 1,018 1,242 49 1,614  
Total 711 1,597 1,259 1,563 50 2,024 7,204 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
 
Table 17 gives evidence how approximately 15% of the still existing joint stock companies experienced one 
sort of deals during 2012. However if we look at these data in a more detailed way, they clearly witness the 
progressive decline of Corporate Italy. The incorporations of new joint stock companies represent only 
1.48% of the deals meanwhile the sum of discontinuities, bankruptcies and liquidation weights for 9.19%. 
Approximately one tenth of the Corporate Italy has put into different procedures of liquidation in just one 
year. Table 18 proposes similar evidence about limited liability joint stock companies. The conversion rate, 
presumably in limited liability joint stock companies counts for 4.2%. 
  
Table 18. Limited liability joint stock companies deals in 2012 
Typologies NI D B L M C Total 
Limited liability joint 
stock companies 
       
Limited liability joint stock 















Simplified limited liability 
joint stock companies 
2,826 2 - 4 - -  
Cooperative limited liability 
joint stock companies 
712 494 52 791 - 84 
 
Limited liability joint stock 
companies 
57,236 42,029 14,514 58,503 716 12,807  
Single Shareholder limited 















Total 76,357 53,571 18,801 72,849 726 15,774 238,078 
Source: Our elaboration from the Infocamere Network 
  
The percentage of limited liability joint stock companies involved in any form of deals during 2012 is 
17.53% and it is quite similar to the one of joint stock companies. This typology of legal entity shows a 
definitely higher ratio of new incorporation (5.62%) on the total of still existing companies, but the sum of 
discontinuities, bankruptcies and liquidations gives evidence that roughly 10% of the still existing limited 
liability joint stock companies are going to expire in short term. Differently the conversion rate of these 
companies are definitely lower, representing the 1.16%. 
 
6. Some concluding remarks 
This research has pursued different targets. Firstly the historical series of stocks and dynamics of a wide 
range of legal entities managing economic activities and businesses in Italy since 2005 to 2013 has been 
properly updated. The outcomes underline the previously trends described in Bellavite Pellegrini (2006, 
2009). The number of joint stock companies is sharply decreasing; conversely the number of limited liability 
joint stock companies is strongly increasing. The number of partnerships slightly decreases, mainly because 
of the diminution of the number of general partnerships. The many coloured world of cooperatives and non- 
profit organization is invested by new interests, in particular associations and foundations, even because of 
the financial crisis breaking up. 
The third section deals with the new institutes introduced by the Reform. Some of them registered a 
substantial success, like single shareholder company; meanwhile others registered only a partial 
implementation, like the issue of special debt devices by limited liability joint stock companies or the 
alternative systems of corporate governance. The entrusting of accounting auditing to an external auditors for 
unlisted companies reveals an increasing appealing, but it is likely (Bellavite Pellegrini, Pellegrini and Sironi 
2009) that the absolute majority stemmed out specific requirements by regulation. The implementation of 
article 2497 about the activity of supervision and coordination by different typologies of legal entities on 
behalf of companies has progressively revealed sizes and nature of the group of enterprises phenomenon. 
Section four introduces a new issue about the ownership structures of unlisted joint stock and limited liability 
companies. These data strongly confirm the idea of an extremely concentrated form of ownership in Italy, 
being the staked owned by the first shareholders more than 51% in more than 50% both of joint stock and 
limited liability companies. If we consider the first three shareholders, these data rise significantly to more 
than 90% of the companies. According to this evidences we may therefore presume the feasible existence of 
a more complex corporate governance only when the first shareholder has less than 33% of the stocks or 
where the shareholders are six or more than six. This case occurs in a percentage ranging between 20% and 
30% of the joint stock companies which approximately correspond to a number ranging between 8,000 and 
11,000 corporations. Incidentally this occurs for a presumably same number of limited liability joint stock 
companies. 
Section five proposes the second innovative issue of this research regarding the numbers of different 
typologies of deals concerning Italian companies. Indirectly it emerges a dramatic overview of the situation 
of the Corporate Italy since about 10% both of joint stock and limited liability companies have been 
discontinued or are going to expire in a very short period of time. 
There is a nourished set for an agenda of future research in this field. In particular we recommend two 
different areas of further development of research’s activities. The institute related with the declaration of 
activity of supervision and coordination by legal entities allows us to further investigate about the nature of 
the Italian Group of enterprises, a field in which there is shortage of reliable empirical evidences. Moreover 
the new databases related to the ownership structures of the joint stock and limited liability companies allow 
us a broader view in the corporate governance of unlisted companies. These evidences must be composed 
with other corporate information relating the business activities of these companies in order to have a better 





[1] Michele Vietti was the MP in charge of the bill of Reform. 
[2] The Monitoring Commitee of the Chamber of Commerce of Milan, headed by Cav. Bruno Ermolli to 
whom I express my personal thanks, made possible the implementation of this research. Many 
acknowledgments to Dr. Stefano Azzali and to the Professors Paolo Montalenti, Gaetano Presti and Mario 
Notari, who, with different tasks, helped me in the conceptual framework of this study and to Sabina Allegri 
and Laura Pellegrini for their support in the implementation of the datasets. 
[3] These datasets show as concluding date of reference March 1st 2013. 
[4] The data provided by these historical series come from two different sources and databases. The 
Italian Firms’ Register which represents the first source is supposed to have expired since February 19th 
1996. By no means the two databases should not theoretically be different, but in relation to this process of 
data storage systems, they may show some differences till 2007 that has been eliminated afterwards. 
[5] The Infocamere Network recognizes five different typologies of corporations: active, not active, 
suspended, in liquidation and in bankruptcy. The sum of the above mentioned five categories determines the 
set of the “still existing” companies. 
[6] For a more specific comprehension of the different marks adopted by the Infocamere Network see 
Bellavite Pellegrini (2006, 2009, 2012). 
[7] For a more specific comprehension of the different marks adopted by the Infocamere Network see 
Bellavite Pellegrini (2006, 2009, 2012). 
[8] During the crisis non-profit entities represent in some way a sort of different answer in building up 
economic activities. 
[9] In brackets we report the percentage on the still existing joint stock companies. 
[10] The evidences at this first date must be taken only in an approximate way. Two tier board companies 
were approximately 90 and one tier board roughly 200. 
[11] In brackets we express the percentage on still existing companies. 
[12] Board of Auditors in limited liability joint stock companies has a mandatory nature according to 
some economic thresholds of the firms, like number of employee, total assets or the amount of accounting 
equity. 
[13] In brackets we give evidence of the percentage on the number of the still existing limited liability 
joint stock companies. 
[14] There are not similar evidences about the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of the entrusting of the 
accounting auditing for limited liability joint stock companies. 
[15] These are Italian legal entities whose nature is not properly classified by Infocamere Network. 
[16] We have complete evidences about 83% of the still existing joint stock companies. 
[17] These evidences are related to approximately 80% of the still existing joint stock companies, with 
the exception of the single shareholder ones. 
[18] These evidences are related to the 55% of the joint stock companies, with the exception of the single 
shareholder ones. 
[19] These data are related to the 91.74% of the still existing limited liability joint stock companies, with 
the exception of the single shareholder ones. 
[20] These data are related to the 36.22% of the still existing limited liability joint stock companies, with 
the exception of the single shareholder ones. 
[21] We take into analysis the following typologies of deals: New incorporations (NI), Discontinuances 
(D), Bankruptcy (B), Liquidations (L), Mergers (M) and Conversions (C). 
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